AbstractÐWhen a group of people want to communicate securely over an open network, they run a conference-key protocol to establish a common conference key K such that all their communications thereafter are encrypted with the key K. In this paper, we propose a provably secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol under the authenticated broadcast channel model. We show that a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key established by the honest participants under the assumption of a variant Diffie-Hellman decision problem. We also show that the honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious. Furthermore, we show that even if the broadcast channel is not authenticated, our protocol is secure against impersonators under the random oracle model.
INTRODUCTION
W HEN a group of people want to communicate securely over an open network, they run a conference-key protocol to establish a common conference key K such that all their communications thereafter are encrypted with key K. The first type of conference-key protocol, called conference-key distribution, is that a chairman selects a conference key and distributes the key to the participants. The second type of conference-key protocol, called conference-key agreement, is that all participants together compute a common key without a chairman. The latter one is suitable for distributed environments. Conference-key protocols are also designed for various types of network connection, such as the ring connection, the star connection, the broadcast connection, etc. The conference keys of a conference-key protocol are either predistributed or dynamic. The conference key is fixed for a particular group of participants in a predistributed conference-key protocol, while it is different for each session in a dynamic conference-key protocol. The predistributed conferencekey protocol often lacks of flexibility.
In this paper, we propose a provably secure faulttolerant conference-key agreement protocol under the authenticated broadcast channel model. The adversary that attacks our protocol can be either active or passive. An active adversary (malicious participant) tries to disrupt establishment of a common conference key among the honest participants, while a passive adversary tries to learn the conference key by listening to the communication of participants. We tolerate the case that a malicious participant gets the conference key since the malicious participant can simply behave properly to get the key. We consider fault tolerance because, sometimes, the conference is emergent and delay or destruction of the conference can cause serious damage. We show that a passive adversary gets no information (zero knowledge) about the common conference key established by the honest participants under the assumption of a variant Diffie-Hellman decision problem. We also show that the honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious.
We can relax the requirement of the broadcast channel being authenticated. An attacker may try to impersonate a participant if the broadcast channel is not authenticated. Following a general practice in provable security, we show that our protocol is secure against impersonators in the random oracle model [1] . The basic technique is to use a signature scheme that is ªexistentially unforgeableº [24] .
Computing a conference key is a special case of secure multiparty computation in which a group of people evaluate a function fk I ; k P ; Á Á Á securely, with each person possessing a private input k i . Therefore, it is possible to have a secure conference-key agreement protocol by the generic construction for secure multiparty computation. However, there are some distinct features in the conferencekey agreement protocol. First, there are no private channels between participants, which is a general assumption in secure multiparty computation. Second, a cheater's goal in a conference-key agreement protocol is to disrupt conferencekey establishment among the honest participants. This is quite different from the goal of cheaters in secure multiparty computation. Third, in multiparty computation, when a cheater is found, the cheater's secret x i , which is shared into others, is recovered by honest participants so that evaluation can proceed. In conference-key agreement, since a cheater's (session) secret is not a necessity in computing a conference key, the cheater is simply excluded from participating when found.
There has been intensive research on conference-key protocols. For example, conference-key distribution protocols (with a chairman) have been studied in [4] , [10] , [11] , [18] , predistributed conference-key protocols have been studied in [5] , [6] , [21] , and conference-key agreement protocols have been studied in [16] , [18] , [19] , [30] , [31] . Most proposed protocols focus on privacy of conference keys and message efficiency for various types of network connection. Nevertheless, they do not have the capability of fault tolerance so that a malicious participant can easily mislead other participants to compute different keys. On the other hand, Klein et al. [17] proposed a fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol. However, the protocol is quite inefficient and its security is not rigidly proven. Burmester and Desmedt [8] proposed an efficient (tworound) protocol (Protocol 3) for the broadcast channel with fk I ; k P ; F F F ; k n g kIkPkPkQÁÁÁknkI mod p. They showed that an eavesdropper cannot compute the common conference key if the Diffie-Hellman decision problem is intractable. In contrast, an eavesdropper gets zero knowledge about the common conference key in our protocol if a variant DiffieHellman decision problem is hard. In the modified Protocol 7 (authenticated key distribution), they used an interactive proof for authenticating sent messages to show that the protocol is secure against impersonators. Nevertheless, the number of rounds in the protocol is proportional to the number of participants. Furthermore, both protocols cannot withstand the attack of malicious participants.
MODEL
A user in the system is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. Each user U i has a secret information x i and a corresponding public information y i . The system has a public directory that records the system's public parameters and each user's public information that can be accessed by everyone. All users are connected by an authenticated broadcast network such that the messages sent on the network can be identified and cannot be altered, blocked, or delayed. Therefore, everyone can send and receive the message on the network without interruption. No private channel exists between users. A group of users who want to establish a conference key is called the set of participants. A participant may be malicious in any way.
There are two types of adversaries that are both probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines. A passive adversary who is not a participant listens to the broadcast channel and tries to learn the conference key established by the honest participants. An active adversary who is a participant tries to disrupt establishment of a common conference key among the honest participants. An active adversary mainly sends ªmaliciousº messages into the broadcast channel to fool an honest participant into believing that he has computed the same conference key as that of other honest participants, while he has not indeed. We don't care about the possibility that two or more cheating participants collaborate and result in one of them or other malicious participants not being able to compute the key. This includes the following case: A malicious participant U i sends ªmaliciousº messages, but all honest participants compute the same key. Another malicious participant, U j , though receiving an incorrect key, still claims that he has received the correct key. We tolerate this case since this type of collaboration between U i and U j does no harm to the honest participants.
A conference-key agreement protocol is secure if it can withstand attacks of passive and active adversaries. For security against a passive adversary, we mean that the adversary alone can construct a view that is computationally indistinguishable from the real conversation occurred among the participants. For security against an active adversary, we mean that if the adversary does not follow the protocol in any way, the probability that he can disrupt establishment of a common conference key among honest participants is negligible.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Our protocol is component-based, that is, our protocol uses cryptographic modules as building blocks. Componentbased design has many merits. First, because of using modular design, it is easy to upgrade the components of the protocol in case better components, in either efficiency, cost, or security, are available. Also, in case security flaws are found in a component, we can replace the component only and need not abandon the whole established system. Second, it is easier to apply strong security analysis on the protocol. Since each component has a single security goal, we can analyze each component in the focused security features. Third, it is flexible and suitable for use in a large system. A conference may be called among the participants all over the world. Flexibility of component-based design allows each user to choose adequate components for each conference session. Therefore, component-based design is suitable for large and heterogeneous systems.
The idea of our design is to decompose the target function f of the secure multiparty computation into n subfunctions f i , I i n. Each participant, U i , handles one subfunction, f i , independently. If participant U i sends out messages such that any other participant cannot evaluate f i , U i is a cheater. The other participants exclude U i from participation and restart the protocol. This process continues until all cheaters are found.
Suppose that each participant U i holds a secret, x i , I i n. They need to evaluate a function f to get the conference key K fk I ; k P ; F F F ; k n , where k i is a randomly selected secret (subkey) of U i for the conference session. In our protocol, we let each participant U i handle a function f i and the conference-key function is fk I ; k P ; F F F ; k n AEf i k I ; k P ; F F F ; k n ; where f i k I ; k P ; F F F ; k n k i . Since the result k i of f i is independent of other parameters k j ; j T i, participant U i can broadcast messages so that other participants can evaluate f i in a secure computation way.
As mentioned previously, our protocol is componentbased. It contains the following components:
1. Component of secure multiparty computation for f i , 2. Component of k i commitment and verification. Our conference key agreement protocol has the following four stages:
1. Secret distribution and commitment: Using the paradigm of secure multiparty computation, each participant U i broadcastsw i so that any participant U j can compute f i F F F ; k i ; F F F k i fromw i and his secret x j . Since the computation is secure, no passive adversary shall get any information about k i . Also, U i broadcastsc i that commits to k i so that other participants can verify the correctness of k i .
2.
Subkey computation and verification: U i computes k H j of all other participants U j ; j T i. When U i gets k H j , he can usec j to check whether k H j is correct. 3. Fault detection: If the above verification is not correct, U i asks U j to reveal information about commitmentc i and messagesw i so that all participants can determine whether U i is cheating. If U i detects a cheater, he deletes the cheater from his participant set and restarts the protocol. 4. Conference-key computation: When no faults are detected, add all subkeys together to get the conference key. Actually, each participant U i can use a different method for securely computing f i and committing to k i as long as the methods are known by other participants.
A CONCRETE PROTOCOL
The system has public parameters:
. p: a large prime number that is Pq I, where q is also a large prime. . H: a one-way permutation from Z q to Z q . . g: a generator for the subgroup G q fi P ji P Z . Public parameter y i g x i mod p. Since q is a prime number, y i is a generator for G q . The protocol starts with an initiator calling for a conference for a set U of participants. Without loss of generality, let U fU I ; U P ; F F F ; U n g be the initial participant set. Each U i , I i n, knows U. a. On receiving w jl , I l n, and j , compute polynomial h H j x (over Z q ) of degree n that passes n l; w jl ; I l n and i; 
where the current participant set is U H fU i I ; U i P ; F F F ; U i m g:
SECURITY ANALYSIS
We show security of the above protocol in correctness, fault tolerance, and withstanding the attack of passive adversaries.
Correctness and Fault Tolerance
For correctness (completeness) of our protocol, we show that if all participants follow the protocol, they compute a common conference key.
Theorem 5.1 (Correctness).
If all participants follow the protocol, they compute a common conference key.
Proof. From the broadcast messages of participant U j , participant U i can compute the polynomial h j x mod q passing points n l; w jl , I l n, and i;
x i j mod p mod q: U i then computes K j h j H mod q. By verification messages j and j , U i can check whether K j is correct. Since, for fixed j and j , the signed text HK j P Z q is unique, all participants compute the same K j . Thus, they compute the same conference key
For fault tolerance (robustness), we show two things:
1. Any malicious participant U i who tries to cheat honest participants into accepting different K i will be excluded from the participant sets of all honest participants. 2. An honest participant will not be excluded from the participant set of any other honest participant. Note that it does not matter that a malicious U i causes other malicious participants to compute different K i .
Lemma 5.2. Any malicious participant U i who tries to cheat honest participants into accepting different K i shall be excluded from the participant sets of all honest participants.
Proof. Malicious participants can deviate from the protocol in two ways. First, a malicious participant U i sends ªwrongº w il ; I l n, i , i , and i so that two honest participants U j and U m compute different K i . In this case, one of them, say U j , shall send V ji = ªfailureº since i and i cannot be the ElGamal signature of two different K i s. Then, U i has to broadcast R i , K i , and S i for verification. Every honest participant verifies whether i g Ri mod p, i ; i is the signature of HK i and the polynomial passing n l; w il ; I l n, and H; K i also passes points j; y Ri j mod p mod q; I j n. Since the honest U j claims that K i is wrong, for all participants, at least one of the above check cannot hold. Therefore, all honest participants exclude U i from their participant sets.
Second, U i sends V ij = ªfailureº to claim that U j is malicious, while U j is indeed honest. In this case, U j broadcasts R j , K j , and S j to prove his honesty. Since U j is honest, all honest participants decide that U i is malicious. Therefore, the malicious U i is excluded by all honest participants. t u Lemma 5.3. No honest participant excludes any other honest participant from his participant set.
Proof. Since an honest participant U i follows the protocol, his broadcast messages make all participants compute the same K i . Even if some malicious participant U j claims that he is faulty, he can send R i , K i , and S i to prove his honesty. Therefore, no honest participant shall exclude U i from his participant set. t u
By the above two lemmas, we can show that all honest participants compute the same conference key even if the majority of the participants are malicious.
Theorem 5.4 (Fault tolerance).
All honest participants have the same participant set and thus compute the same conference key no matter how many participants are malicious.
Proof. By the above two lemmas, each honest participant's participant set consists of two types of participants: honest participants and those participants U i who, though deviating from the protocol, make all honest participants compute the same K i . Therefore, all honest participants compute the same conference key. t u
Security against Passive Attackers
A passive attacker (eavesdropper) tries to learn information about the conference key by listening to the broadcast channel. We show that an eavesdropper cannot get any information about K i of U i by demonstrating that the attacker's view of the messages broadcast by U i on the broadcast channel can be simulated without knowing secrets x i and K i . We use tuples of random variables to model the attacker's view and the simulated one. We say that the attacker's view and the simulated view (transcript) are computationally indistinguishable if no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can tell the sampling source by observing given samples. Since the simulated view is constructed without knowing U i 's secrets and is computationally indistinguishable from the real view, the attacker gets no information about U i 's secrets.
We need an assumption to show that the simulated transcript is computationally indistinguishable from the real one. This assumption is a little stronger than that about the regular Diffie-Hellman decision problem that is discussed in some papers [7] , [23] , [29] . The assumption about the regular Diffie-Hellman decision problem is that, for any given y I ; y P P G q À fIg, the following two tuples of random variables, y I ; y P ; y R I mod p; y R P mod p and y I ; y P ; u I ; u P ; are computationally indistinguishable, where R is randomly chosen from Z q and u I and u P are randomly chosen from G q . Therefore, y I ; y P ; y R I mod p mod q; y R P mod p mod q and y I ; y P ; u I mod q; u P mod q are computationally indistinguishable. Note that y I and y P must be quadratic residues of Z Ã p ; otherwise, one can tell the above probability distributions apart. We note that u I mod q and u P mod q do not range all over Z q . Therefore, we need an assumption about a variation of the Diffie-Hellman decision problem.
Assumption 1 (Variant Diffie-Hellman decision problem).
Let p Pq I and G q be the quadratic-residue subgroup of Z Ã p . Given any generators y I ; y P P G q À fIg, the following two random-variable tuples are computationally indistinguishable: y I ; y P ; y R I mod p mod q; y R P mod p mod q and y I ; y P ; u I ; u P ; where R; u I ; u P P Z q .
The simulator of the adversary's view on broadcast messages of U i does the following:
1. R a n d o m l y s e l e c t w We now show, on random variables K i ; R i P Z q ; S i P Z We don't have a rigid proof for our protocol's strength against impersonators if the channel is not authenticated. Nevertheless, we give some explanation for the protocol's strength in this case. First, if the impersonator chooses K i first and then signs HK i , he has to sign a chosen message HK i , which is not known to be possible in the ElGamal signature scheme. Second, if the impersonator chooses m HK i first, he has to compute K i H ÀI m in order to share K i with other participants. This occurs with only a negligible probability under H being a one-way permutation. Strong evidence shows that this approach (fulldomain-hash-then-sign) is secure against signature forgery, thus impersonators [2] .
In provable security, the random oracle model is sometimes adopted to demonstrate security of a protocol by assuming that the hash function is actually a random function. Under the random oracle model, we can relax the requirement of the ªauthenticatedº broadcast channel since the signature part of our protocol is ªexistentially unforgeableº against the adaptively chosen message attack. Therefore, we show that, even if the broadcast channel is not authenticated, our protocol is secure against impersonators under the random oracle model. Theorem 6.1. Assume that the broadcast channel is not authenticated. If computing discrete logarithm modulo a prime is hard, our protocol is secure against an impersonator's adaptively chosen message attack under the random oracle model.
Proof. The proof follows from that in [24] directly. Under the random oracle model, we assume that the one-way permutation H is a true random function, that is, HK i is an independent random variable from K i . Note that, since the hash result is random now, we have to put it as a part of the signature. Also, since the ElGamal signature is ªexistentially forgeable,º the chosen message query on K i can be answered as follows: We first produce an existential forgery (h H , H , H ) and let h H be the hash result HK i . Assume that an impersonator can impersonate U i . Then, he can sign K i with a nonnegligible probability . By a probability argument, there exists a set of (K i , S i ) such that, for any particular (K i , S i ) in , the impersonator can sign K i with S i with a probability at least =P. We use the impersonator to sign K i into two different results (K i ; i ; h I ; I i ) and (K i ; i ; h P ; P i ) with a nonnegligible probability, where i g Si mod p,
I
i S ÀI i h I À i x i mod q, P i S ÀI i h P À i x i mod q, and h I and h P are the hash results of HK i under the random oracle model. Since the random factor i is used twice, one can compute U i 's secret x i , which is a contradiction. t u
CONCLUSION
Assuming an authenticated broadcast channel, we have presented a conference-key agreement protocol that is provably secure against passive and active adversaries under the assumption of a variant Diffie-Hellman decision problem. We argue that our protocol is secure against impersonators if the full-domain-hash-then-sign paradigm for ElGamal signature is secure. Furthermore, we show that, even if the broadcast channel is not authenticated, our protocol is secure against impersonators under the random oracle model. Our protocol is efficient. It uses only two rounds to compute a common conference key after all malicious participants are detected. Nevertheless, the size of messages that each participant sends is proportional to the number of participants. It is interesting to design a provably secure conference-key agreement protocol with both round and message-efficiency.
